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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael 
Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using “the fundamental emotion 
of surprise” as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof.1  More 
specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the 
burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even “beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”2  Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold 
using “words of estimative surprise”3—asking jurors how surprised they 
would be if the fact in question were not true.  Toward this goal (and being 
averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such as “mildly surprised, 
surprised, quite surprised, greatly surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.”4 
We find Professor Risinger’s proposal intriguing.  After all, one can 
imagine important theoretical reasons why surprise might generate different 
results from probability.  To the extent that the surprise formulation is 
 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Christian J. Moran, United States Court of Federal Claims, 
Office of Special Masters. 
** FedEx Research Professor (2017–18) and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.  
Thanks to Dale Nance for helpful comments, as well as Michael Risinger and participants at 
the Symposium on Experts, Inference and Innocence at Seton Hall Law School in October 
2017.  All recruitment and experimental procedures were approved by the Vanderbilt 
Institutional Review Board (IRB # 081408). 
 1  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply that We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 
(2018). 
 2  David H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules 
Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (1999). 
 3  Risinger, supra note 1. 
 4  Risinger, supra note 1. 
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unfamiliar, it might cause jurors to think holistically (“System 1”) as opposed 
to attempting to use rules (often misremembered or misapplied) about 
probability (“System 2”).5  Surprise might be easier to approach 
qualitatively, unlike probability, which cries out for quantitative calculation 
and invokes the fear of numbers for some.  Surprise is also notably framed 
in the negative (“How surprised would you be if the fact were not true?”) 
compared to its probability counterpart (“What is the probability that the fact 
is true?”). 
Being empiricists, we thus could not help but put Professor Risinger’s 
worthy proposal to the test, if only in a preliminary way.  Just what might 
conceptualizing evidence under a framework of “surprise” look like and get 
us in practice?  Here, we report on a simple experiment where potential jurors 
were recruited to evaluate evidence using both a surprise framework and a 
framework using probabilistic language.  Using the experiment, we set out 
to answer two questions: First, does using degrees of “surprise” actually 
produce intelligible and consistent results among laypersons?  And second, 
does using degrees of “surprise” to evaluate evidence produce results that 
provide a material benefit, either empirically or normatively, when compared 
to frameworks based on probability? 
II. DESIGN AND METHODS 
For our study, we used an online platform, which allowed us to recruit 
a large sample of individuals to evaluate scenarios under both the proposed 
surprise and the traditional probability frameworks.  Because it was likely 
that the differences between probabilistic and surprise-based evidence 
evaluation interact with the weight of the evidence, we wrote scenarios 
where the weight of the evidence could be set to different levels. 
To ensure that the subjects’ responses were not influenced by their 
answers to other questions, we used a between-subjects experimental design:  
Each subject evaluated only a single scenario and provided a response using 
either a probabilistic or a surprise framework, but not both. 
Seven scenarios were written for the purpose of this study.  Each 
involved the same basic fact pattern in which “Bob” was charged with the 
murder of his co-worker and friend “James.”  However, the scenarios varied 
with regard to the weight of the evidence against “Bob.”  The scenarios were 
written so as to impress upon the reader different levels of culpability, 
ranging from virtually certain innocence (“Evidence Level 1”) to virtually 
certain guilt (“Evidence Level 7”).  The seven scenarios are reproduced in 
Table A below. 
 
 5  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) for a comprehensive 
discussion of this dual-process framework of human psychology.   
GINTHERCHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:34 PM 
2018] SURPRISE VS. PROBABILITY 1083 
 
TABLE A: THE SCENARIOS 
 
 Scenario 
Evidence 
Level 1 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  A security camera 
shows both of them leaving a sporting event 
together shortly before James’s death.  Bob denied 
the charges from the beginning, reporting that they 
had gone their separate ways soon after.  The 
murder weapon, a bloody knife, was found stuck 
in James’s body.  DNA testing determined that the 
blood on the knife was a mixture of James and 
another male, but was not a match to Bob. 
Evidence 
Level 2 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  James was found dead 
of a gunshot wound in his office and investigators 
received an anonymous call reporting that Bob 
and James had recently been feuding.  Police 
found a gun in Bob’s car, but later determined that 
Bob had a permit to carry the gun, and the bullet 
that killed James was not fired from it.  
Nonetheless, witnesses can corroborate that Bob 
and James had been feuding. 
Evidence 
Level 3 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  James was found 
strangled to death in his own home.  Bob is the last 
person known to have visited James the night 
before James was murdered.  There was no 
physical evidence found at the scene of the crime 
and neighbors reported not hearing any noise or 
activity in James’ house after Bob left. 
Evidence 
Level 4 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  A witness reports that 
Bob and James had a loud argument at a local bar 
close in time to James’s approximate time of 
death. 
Evidence 
Level 5 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  James was last seen 
accompanying Bob on a camping trip.  Bob 
reports that the trip was uneventful and that at the 
end of the trip James drove home.  However, no 
trace of James or his vehicle has ever been found.  
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Bob has faced some recent financial troubles, and 
had disagreed with James on whether to sell a 
jointly owned apartment building.  Upon James’s 
death, Bob became the sole owner of the 
apartment building. 
Evidence 
Level 6 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  A witness reports that 
on the night of the murder, Bob and James had a 
loud argument at a local bar over an affair that 
James had been having with Bob’s wife.  Another 
witness states that she heard the sound of gunshots 
minutes after the time a 911 call reporting the fight 
was placed. 
Evidence 
Level 7 
Bob has been charged with the murder of his co-
worker and friend, James.  A witness reports that 
on the night of the murder, Bob and James had a 
loud argument at a local bar over an affair that 
James had been having with Bob’s wife.  Video 
surveillance outside the bar shows Bob shooting 
James.  Bob was apprehended fleeing from the 
scene by an off-duty officer, who found the 
murder weapon in Bob’s waistband.   
 
After evaluating the scenario, subjects were asked two independent 
questions.  First, subjects were asked to provide a numerical evaluation of 
the strength of the evidence.  This first question was framed either in terms 
of the subjects’ estimated probability or the subjects’ experience of surprise.  
Because probability and surprise can pertain to both the defendant’s guilt and 
innocence, we framed the question both ways for each.  This resulted in four 
possible questions that the subject could be asked to evaluate.  Which 
question was presented to any given subject was determined randomly.  The 
four possible questions are presented in Table B. 
 
 
TABLE B: THE MEASURES 
 
Measure Prompt 
p(Guilty) 
 
Based on what is known, what do you believe is 
the probability (expressed as a percentage) that 
Bob murdered James?  
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p(Not Guilty) 
 
Based on what is known, what do you believe is 
the probability (expressed as a percentage) that 
Bob DID NOT murder James?  
 
surprise(Guilty) 
 
Based on what is known, how surprised would 
you be to find out that Bob murdered James?  
 
surprise(Not 
Guilty) 
 
Based on what is known, how surprised would 
you be to find out that Bob DID NOT murder 
James?  
 
 
Subjects provided the response to this numerical question on a 101-
point Likert scale.  We understand that Professor Risinger’s proposal 
expressed a desire to eliminate all “unwarranted cardinality” from 
representations of evidence,6 and thus use of this numerical Likert scale may 
be inconsistent with his vision.  For the purposes of this study, however, we 
wanted to be able to make meaningful comparisons between the probability 
framework and the surprise framework.  We therefore used the 0-100 scale 
as a matter of convenience.  Future research may want to consider different 
approaches.  For example, one might transform Professor Risinger’s 
categories (e.g., moderately surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.) into a 
numerical space for comparison purposes, though the specifics of such a 
transform would likely be subjective and contested. 
Second, all subjects were asked to make a legal determination of guilt 
on the basis of the scenario.  Specifically, subjects were asked: “Based on 
what is known, do you think that Bob is guilty of murder?”  We included this 
question so that we could evaluate how the subjects’ evaluation of the 
evidence—under either the probabilistic or the surprise framework—related 
to their legal determinations. 
In total, we recruited 593 individuals to participate in this study in 
October 2017.  All recruitment and experimental procedures were approved 
by the Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board.  For recruiting subjects, we 
used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service (AMT). AMT is an online 
marketplace where individuals across the globe can perform various tasks 
for payment from various providers.  Such web-based recruiting techniques 
have been widely validated (that is, online subjects have been demonstrated 
 
 6  Risinger, supra note 1. 
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to display similar behavior to subjects recruited using conventional means), 
and the resulting population samples are substantially more representative 
than the convenience samples (e.g., of college students) typically used in 
such studies.7  There is, of course, always the possibility that remote subjects 
may not be fully attentive to the task at hand.  To account for this, we 
excluded subjects who took an abnormal amount of time to respond.8  
Further, we only used subjects who had an established history of 
satisfactorily completing tasks on AMT.  Ultimately, 469 subjects were 
included in the final analysis.9 
Subjects who agreed to participate were directed through AMT to the 
actual experiment, which was hosted by Qualtrics.  Qualtrics is a web-based 
platform that is regularly used by scholars in many fields for hosting surveys 
and experiments.  At the conclusion of their participation, subjects were 
debriefed and paid at an approximate rate of $6 per hour. 
Before participating, Amazon confirmed that all potential participants 
were over the age of 18 and were United States (US) citizens or residents by 
means of a US-based bank account as well as their IP address.  All 
experiments ended with subjects providing some demographic information, 
which allowed us to confirm that the sample was generally representative of 
the US jury-eligible population (57% male with a median age of 33). 
III. RESULTS 
Figure 1 displays the responses provided by subjects for each of the 
four prompts and each evidence level, along with the median (in green).  
Figure 1 allows us to compare how subjects estimate evidentiary strength 
under a surprise framework and a probability framework.  The figures, 
however, do not tell us if one of the frameworks is doing a better job than 
 
 7  See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011); Jon Sprouse, A Validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the 
Collection of Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 155 
(2011).  
 8  Subjects whose timing was two standard deviations faster or slower than the average 
participant were excluded.  This is a customary screening technique to detect non-compliance 
with task instructions.  
 9  A pilot version of this study was run in August 2017.  That version was largely similar 
in design to the version of the study presented here except that the scenarios in the pilot 
version were scaled from equipoise of guilt to a high probability of guilt; no scenario 
contained evidence of innocence.  In addition to this, we used different scenario facts and the 
questions were framed to subjects differently.  Subjects that completed the pilot version of 
this study were blocked from participating in the final version of the study.  The design 
implemented here was changed from the pilot version of the study as a result of feedback 
provided by colleagues who reviewed the manuscript prior to the Symposium, and we thank 
them for their suggestions.  The major findings observed here were also observed in the pilot 
study.   
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the other.  To further evaluate this question, we can compare the estimates 
with how likely subjects were (considered in aggregate) to find guilt on the 
basis of the evidence.  We derived this likelihood measure from the subjects’ 
response to the first question (i.e., “Based on what is known, do you think 
that Bob is guilty of murder?”).  Importantly, every subject answered this 
question, and it was answered prior to the response to the second question. 
As a result, we can collapse all responses across the surprise and probability 
conditions. Figure 2 adds an additional line (in red) representing the 
proportion of subjects finding the defendant guilty (or not guilty) on the basis 
of the evidence. 
 
FIGURE 1: MEAN EVIDENCE STRENGTH UNDER SURPRISE AND 
PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORKS 
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FIGURE 2: MEDIAN EVIDENCE STRENGTH UNDER SURPRISE AND 
PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORKS COMPARED TO GUILT DETERMINATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 suggests that the median of the surprise(Not Guilty) metric tracks 
the actual conviction rate as well as, if not better than, the median of the 
p(Guilty) metric.  The inverse metrics p(Not Guilty) and surprise(Guilty) 
tracked the actual acquittal rate less well,10 though the way in which they 
deviated differed. 
 
 10  To formally assess “how well” the estimations tracked the guilt determinations, we 
performed a correlation analysis between subjects’ estimations and their decisions of guilt for 
each of the metrics.  This analysis allows us to calculate the strength of the relationship 
between the two responses.  The r2 values were as follows: p(Guilty), 0.63; p(Not Guilty), 
0.25; surprise(Guilty), 0.32; surprise(Not Guilty), 0.52.  All of the metrics showed significant 
correlations (ps < 0.05).  However, the strength of the correlations for p(Guilty) and 
surprise(Not Guilty) were significantly higher than for the other two metrics (Zs > 2.09; ps < 
0.05).  
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        Another way of assessing metrics is to evaluate their internal coherence.  
For example, p(Guilty) and p(Not Guilty) should be complements, as should 
surprise(Guilty) and surprise(Not Guilty).  Figure 3 plots the two probability 
metrics together, and the two innocence metrics together.  Theoretically, the 
curves of the median estimates should form an “X,” which is the case for the 
surprise metrics.  The probability metrics, however, do not, as the p(Not 
Guilty) curve exhibits some flattening for non-extreme evidence levels. 
 
FIGURE 3: EXAMINATION OF INTERNAL COHERENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One final possibility for assessing the four metrics is to consider 
their level of dispersion.  Even if we cannot agree on a “ground truth” by 
which to evaluate the accuracy of the metrics, we might agree that getting a 
tight distribution of estimates from participants is preferable.  To examine 
how consistent subjects are when making probability or surprise evaluations 
of evidence, we looked at the results in the following way:  We first 
centered11 the data for each probe and evidence level.  After centering, the 
data from each evidence level for a given prompt was combined.  Figure 4 
plots the histograms of the deviations from the mean for each metric.  Visual 
examination suggests that the spreads are all similar.  A statistical analysis 
indicates that the variance in subjects’ responses for p(Guilty), p(Not 
Guilty), and surprise(Not Guilty) were statistically similar.12  Subjects’ 
 
 11  To center means to subtract the mean of the set from each item in the set.  This 
transformation normalizes for mean, but not for variance.  To normalize for both the mean 
and variance is called a z-transformation.  
 12  Brown-Forsythe Test: F(2,348) = 0.35, p = 0.701.   
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variance in their responses for surprise(Guilty), however, were greater than 
the other three.13 
 
FIGURE 4: BOXPLOTS OF DEVIATION FROM MEDIAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13  Brown-Forsythe Test: F(3,364) = 4.37, p = 0.005. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
This exploratory study is meant to be nothing more than prefatory.  
We hope that it can begin a conversation and provide a starting point for 
future, more comprehensive studies.  Concordantly, we caution the reader to 
be especially guarded when making conclusions.  With those caveats in 
mind, there are several aspects to the results that excite us for what they may 
ultimately reveal. 
As an initial matter, surprise appears to be a viable metric.  This 
outcome is interesting if for no other reason than the fact that surprise is an 
unusual way of conceptualizing the strength of evidence.  In our experience, 
individuals are quite familiar with estimating their confidences using a 
probabilistic framework.  By contrast, expressing confidence in a conclusion 
by indicating a high level of hypothetical surprise over the opposite outcome 
is a procedure few are familiar with.  Nonetheless, this study shows that 
surprise measures are highly consistent across subjects.  In fact, when we 
compare the amount of variance that subjects display when making 
responses using a surprise framework we find that it is no different from the 
variance in responses using a probabilistic framework. In other words, 
subjects appear to be equally consistent when gauging the strength of 
evidence using surprise as they are with probabilities. 
This finding on consistency partially mitigates Professor Risinger’s 
concern that there may be “significant variability” between individuals when 
making assessments based on surprise.14  To be sure, his concern was that 
individuals might value word-based strength categories differently.  What 
we have shown here, however, is that at least with respect to numerical 
presentations, potential jurors seem to share a common “surprise scale,” or 
at least one no worse than for numerical probabilities.  An insistence on 
word-based strength categories may generate additional problems, but at 
least there is nothing inherent about the concept of surprise that promotes 
greater inconsistency among subjects. 
One possible explanation for the similar variability between the 
probability and surprise metrics is that subjects are using a similar mental 
calculus to determine their response.  For example, perhaps all subjects 
basically think in terms of probabilities, whether asked about probability 
explicitly or asked about level of surprise.  This explanation, however, is 
undercut by the data in Figure 1.  While it is true that subjects evaluate 
evidence similarly (if not identically) under a p(Guilty) and a surprise(Not 
Guilty) framework, that is not true for the converse measures: p(Not Guilty) 
and surprise(Guilty).  The divergence between p(Not Guilty) and 
surprise(Guilty), which we might reasonably expect to also track each other 
1-to-1, is remarkable. For example, at Evidence Levels 4–6, a typical subject 
 
 14  Risinger, supra note 1. 
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reports a probability of innocence of about 50% while a typical subject 
reports surprise at the defendant’s guilt to be about 20 out of 100.  As the 
amount of inculpatory evidence increases, this gap narrows somewhat, but 
remains substantial until Evidence Level 7. 
Why the lack of correspondence between the measures of p(Not 
Guilty) and surprise(Guilty) given the high level of correspondence between 
p(Guilty) and surprise(Not Guilty)?  Our current data reveals no answers.  
Future studies may want to consider debriefing subjects to understand their 
thought process when making the determinations.  Future studies may also 
try to design an experiment that associates this divergence with a known 
psychological phenomenon. 
Where should others go from here?  To begin, there is no better 
statistical measure of the robustness of a result than replication.15  Though 
not presented here beyond a footnote, we think it is important to note that the 
results presented here served as a replication of a pilot study, finding 
substantially the same results. That said, we hope that others will try to 
replicate these results in other contexts.  For example, do the results hold if 
mock jurors are instructed using pattern jury instructions (or their corollary) 
rather than using a simple rating scale?  What happens if the quantitative 
scales are replaced by word categories as Professor Risinger proposed?  
What happens if the vignettes become more factually complex, or draw from 
the civil context, or involve potential biasing mechanisms like race or 
gender? 
A final possibility is to push further on the thought that surprise 
encourages a more holistic or System 2 approach to the problem of evidence.  
Along these lines, one question is whether surprise might protect against 
common probabilistic fallacies.  One of the most ubiquitous probabilistic 
fallacies in legal contexts is the base rate fallacy.  This fallacy concerns the 
little weight subjects give to base rates when computing likelihood.  To 
formally test whether using measures of surprise might ameliorate the effects 
of this fallacy in decision-making, we presented 357 subjects16 with a variant 
of Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky’s classic hypothetical involving green 
and blue cabs.  Specifically: 
 
Following a recent baseball game, a number of cars in the ballpark 
parking lot were found to have had their windows smashed in. 
 
 
 15  STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE 
310 (2d ed. 2014) (“Replication does not depend on assumptions about normality, sphericity, 
or independence. Replication is not distorted by outliers. Replication is a cornerstone of 
science.  Replication is the best statistic.”).  
 16  In total, 379 subjects were recruited using the same methods and procedures described 
for the main experiment.  See Part II, supra. 
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At the game, 85% of the fans supported the green team and were 
wearing green.  Meanwhile 15% of the fans were supporting the 
blue team and wearing blue.  Only individuals with tickets had 
access to the parking lot. 
 
A witness, the parking lot attendant, reports that the person who 
vandalized the cars was wearing blue.  However, it was nighttime 
when the vandalism occurred.  The court tested the reliability of 
the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night 
of the crime and concluded that the witness correctly identified 
each one of the two colors 80% of the time and failed 20% of the 
time.  
 
The correct answer is 41%.  When subjects were asked for the 
probability that the perpetrator wore blue, most respondents answered 80%, 
which represents the classic base rate fallacy result.  Respondents focused 
on the accuracy of the witness and did not account for the low base rate of 
blue team fans.  Intriguingly, however, when asked how surprised they 
would be that the perpetrator wore green, the responses indicated that 
significantly fewer people were susceptible to the base rate effect.  Figure 5 
presents histograms of the responses.  While it is difficult to formally 
compare the two distributions since the parameter is different, we note that 
80% of the responses estimated a probability of greater than 50%, while only 
57% of the responses provided a level of surprise greater than 50 out of 100. 
 
FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAM OF RESPONSES FROM BASE RATE EXPERIMENT 
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While the dispersion associated with surprise(Green) may be 
undesirable, these very preliminary results suggest that surprise may indeed 
cause people to think about evidence differently, and may be a tool that the 
legal system can harness to address base rate neglect. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Surprise offers an intriguing framework both for communicating the 
burden of proof to jurors and for having the jurors think about the evidence 
in a case.  Our preliminary results show that surprise is a viable metric that 
jurors can apply in meaningful and reasonably consistent ways.  Yet, as one 
might expect, our results raise more questions than they answer.  Why is the 
probability of innocence handled differently by mock jurors, so that its 
estimate coheres with neither estimates of the probability of innocence nor 
estimates of surprise?  And can surprise offer a useful way to address base 
rate neglect?  Professor Risinger has certainly opened the door to some 
interesting questions. 
 
